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COMMENTS
WAGE GARNISHMENT: STILL DRIVING THE WAGE-
EARNING FAMILY TO THE WALL
INTRODUCTION
In ancient Rome, a defaulting debtor faced one of two
possible fates at the option of his creditors; his body could be
divided into pieces in proportion to the amount he owed each
creditor or he could be sold into slavery.' Creditors' remedies
have since undergone drastic evolution, but the underlying
thought remains: a man has a duty to pay back his debts.
Should the debtor fail to willingly repay his debts, societal laws
will support the creditor in his attempt to coerce repayment.
The moral underpinnings of laws to aid the creditor against the
defaulting debtor have been clear throughout history. During
the decline of feudalism, for example, insolvency was a mortal
sin.' Debtors were excommunicated from the church and
barred from receiving the sacraments or a Christian burial.'
In the United States, it was not until the nineteenth cen-
tury that imprisonment of the defaulting debtor began to
wane.' As the self-defeating nature of debtor's prison became
1. This rather harsh election of remedies by the creditor was the law under the
Twelve Tables of Rome. H. JOLOwicz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ROMAN LAW 190-92 (2d ed. 1952); R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 427-28 (4th
ed. 1956); Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REv. 24, 24-25 (1926).
2. In general, all attempted reforms of imprisonment for debt were resisted by
the clergy. In some regions, the priest who absolved a dying debtor became liable for
his debts. See Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REv. 24, 25-26 (1926).
3. Id.
4. Id. 25-33. It was not until the 1830's that state constitutional amendments
abolishing imprisonment of defaulting debtors were enacted. New York passed such a
statute in 1831. Act of April 26, 1831, ch. 300, 1831 N.Y. Laws 396. See Note, Arrest
and Imprisonment in Civil Actions in New York, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 172 (1951). Other
states soon followed with similar amendments. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 20; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 15 (the California Constitution forbids imprisonment for debt in any
civil action except in cases involving fraud or wilful injury to person or property); GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 21 (Georgia was founded specifically as a place where debtors
would be given a fresh start); MD. CONST. art. III, § 38.
Until 1971, Maine still allowed imprisonment for failure to pay civil debts.
Maine's statute, which was amended in 1971 by adding the word "not" and deleting
the second sentence, read as follows: "In any civil action, except where express provi-
sion is made by law to the contrary, an execution shall [not] run against the body of
the judgment debtor. He may be arrested and imprisoned thereon for the purpose of
obtaining a discovery of his property wherewith to satisfy it." ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14,
§ 3701 (1964) (amended 1971).
632 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
apparent, other creditors' remedies had to be devised to effec-
tively coerce the balking debtor. One such measure was gar-
nishment, a procedure of attaching property belonging to or
owing to the debtor but in the possession of a third party.
The plaintiff in a garnishment action does not acquire a
full and clear lien on specific property in possession of a third
party (garnishee), but only the right to hold the garnishee per-
sonally liable for it or for its value.5 Wage garnishment refers
to the common situation where the property to be garnisheed
consists of wages owed to the debtor by his employer.'
This comment examines the effects of the existing federal
and California wage garnishment laws upon the defaulting
5. Garnishment is not synonymous with attachment-a popular misconcep-
tion-both measures are purely statutory creations and each is defined by the state
creating them. See, e.g., Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934).
Attachment is a prejudgment remedy whereby a plaintiff can seize control of
defendant's property for use as security for a judgment in a subsequent action. It is
not to be confused with either execution (seizure of defendant's property after a judg-
ment) or with replevin or claim and delivery (seizure of property in possession of
defendant in which plaintiff claims a specific property interest). See CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 481.010-92.090 (West Supp. 1977) (operative January 1, 1977). See generally
Recommendation Relating to Revision of the Attachment Law, to appear in 13
CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 801 (1975).
Fainer, The Prejudgment Attachment Remedy in California, 51 L.A. B.J. 95 (1975);
Note, Attachment in California: A New Look at an Old Writ, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1254
(1970); Comment, Attachment and Garnishment in California-In Need of Reform, 4
U.C.D.L. REV. 57 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, California Garnishment];
Comment, California's New Attachment Law: Problems in Interpretation, 23 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 792 (1976).
Whereas garnishment reaches the goods, chattels, credits or effects the debtor in
the hands of a third person, attachment involves only the rights of a creditor in the
property of his debtor. See Kimball v. Richardson Kimball Co., 111 Cal. 386, 43 P.
1111 (1896); Meacham v. Meacham, 262 Cal. App. 248, 68 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1968);
Steineck v. Haas-Baruch Co., 106 Cal. App. 228, 288 P. 1104 (1930); Finch v. Finch,
12 Cal. App. 274, 107 P. 594 (1909), hearing denied, 12 Cal. App. 285, 107 P. 598 (1910).
6. The question then arises as to what constitutes a "debt" other than wages
already earned and owing to the debtor. A debt that is uncertain and contingent in
the sense that it may never become due and payable is not subject to garnishment.
Thomas v. Thomas, 192 Cal. App. 2d 771, 13 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1961); Dawson v. Bank
of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 100 Cal. App. 2d 305, 223 P.2d 280 (1950);
Clecak v. Dunn, 95 Cal. App. 537, 272 P. 1104 (1928). However, a debt that is not
uncertain but is simply not yet due is subject to garnishment. The money must be fully
earned but not payable until a future time, Philbrook v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Cal.
App. 187, 257 P. 882 (1927), and it is not essential that there be a present right to sue.
Meacham v. Meacham, 262 Cal. App. 2d 248, 68 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1968); Brianard v.
Rogers, 74 Cal. App. 247, 239 P. 1095 (1925). As a general rule, a claim for unliquidated
damages, such as a claim for tort damages, is not a debt and may not be garnisheed.
6 AM. JUR. 2D Attachment and Garnishment § 127 (1963). Nor is a debt conditioned
on further performance before payment is due subject to garnishment until the condi-
tion is fulfilled. Id. § 129; see Annot., 12 A.L.R.2D 787 (1950).
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debtor in an attempt to assess whether those effects are consis-
tent with the purposes for enacting such laws.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Garnishment procedure, under the guise of attachment,
first made its debut in American statutory law in Maryland in
16831 and Pennsylvania in 1699; s it soon became one of the
most popular devices in the creditors' arsenal of remedies., In
the early 1800's, however, garnishment was far from the power-
7. In 1683, the province of Maryland passed an act which regulated attachment
proceedings against absentee defendants when third persons had "goods, chattels or
credits" of that defendant in their possession. The liability of such third persons, called
"garnishees," was detailed by the statute. Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and
Bankruptcy, 27 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 n.40 (1943).
8. In 1699, Pennsylvania, under the proprietary government of William Penn,
enacted its first statute which regulated the attachment of assets in the hands of either
the debtor or third persons, who were referred to as garnishees. See id. at 12 n.41
(1943), citing CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN AND LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA
289 (1879). Attachments had been authorized by the Duke of York's Laws (1663) which
William Penn made applicable to the colony in 1676. Id., citing CHARTER TO WILLIAM
PENN AND LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA 10 (1879).
Other states and territories followed suit with similar statutory enactments in the
late 1700's and early 1800's. Id., at 12-17. For a general history of the development of
garnishment laws in the United States, see Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments
in American Law-A Historical Inventory & a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155 (1957).
9. For an example of other common remedies, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4(b) (1970)
(petitions for involuntary bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 481.010-492.090 (West Supp. 1977) (attachment); id. § 486.010 (temporary
restraining order); id. §§ 509-521 (claim and delivery); id. §§ 681-713.5 (execution);
id. §§ 1132-1135 (cognovit notes); CAL. COM. CODE § 9-503 (West 1964) (self-help
repossession). See generally D. COWANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 882 (1963);
Annot., 45 A.L.R.3D 1233 (1972); 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Creditors' Rights and Remedies §§
1-519 (1974); Alexander, Curring the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help
Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893 (1975); Broker, The Practical Aspects of
Claim and Delivery, 51 L.A. B. BULL. 121 (1975); Catz & Robinson, Due Process and
Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia and
Beyond, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 541 (1975); Fainer, The Prejudgment Attachment Remedy
in California, 51 L.A.B.J. 95 (1975); Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An
Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82 (1973); McCall, The Past as Prologue: A
History of the Right to Repossess, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 58 (1973); Ordin, Summary
Creditor Remedies: A Thing of the Past?, 47 L.A.B.J. 230 (1972); Note, Cognovit
Judgments: Some Constitutional Considerations, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1970); Com-
ment, Due Process and the Creditor's Right to Prejudgment Seizure, 10 GONZAGA L.
REV. 757 (1975); Comment, The Demise of Summary Prejudgment Remedies in
California, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 489 (1972); Note, Confessions of Judgement, 102 U. PA.
L. REv. 524 (1954); Note, Summary Creditor Remedies: Going, Going, Gone?, 10 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 292 (1973); Comment, Confessions of Judgment: The Due Process
Defects, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 279 (1970); Comment, Attachment in California: Another
Round of Creditor's Rights and Debtor Protection, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1015 (1973);
Comment, California's New Attachment Law: Problems in Interpretation, 23 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 792 (1976).
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ful creditor remedy that it is today. The colonial and rural
creditor knew his customers personally and extended credit on
that basis. Because of his personal knowledge, he was apt to
know the reasons why a person could not repay his debt on time
and, therefore, he was less likely to resort to as harsh and
impersonal a collection device as garnishment. 0
Wage garnishment has since grown in significance as a
creditor remedy and can best be understood in view of this
country's change from a rural nation of farmers and self-
employed shopkeepers to the urban nation of wage-earners it
is now. l The creditor today no longer knows the person with
whom he is dealing; he must rely upon impersonal financial
data and must resort, when necessary, to routine collection
devices which are inflexible when applied to the individual.
Accompanying rapid urbanization was the boom in the use of
credit by the average American consumer and the disappear-
ance of the social stigma of personal debt. For evidence of this
change in societal attitudes toward indebtedness, one needs
only to look at the growing amounts of consumer credit. In
1945, for example, outstanding consumer credit in the United
States totalled $5.7 billion."2 By June, 1975, however, consumer
credit had burgeoned to a staggering $186.1 billion-approxi-
mately $874.53 for every individual in the United States. 3 In
1974, of the $166.5 billion extended in installment credit only
$157.8 billion was repaid, leaving an outstanding balance of
$8.7 billion." Outstanding installment credit for 1975 has
10. See Patterson, Forward: Wage Garnishment-An Extraordinary Remedy
Run Amuk, 43 WASH. L. REV. 735 (1968).
11. Evidence of this country's transition from its agricultural base to its present
industrial one has been agriculture's steadily decreasing share of the total employ-
ment-41% in 1900 to 4% in 1970.
12. 55 FED. RES. BULL., Jan., 1969, at A52.
13. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, A GUIDE TO CONSUMER MARKETS 1975/76, at 147
(1975). In 1950, total outstanding consumer credit (installment and noninstallment)
was $21.5 billion; in 1960, $56.1 billion; in 1965, $89.9 billion; and in 1970, $127.2
billion. Id. The outstanding consumer credit peaked at $190.1 billion by June, 1974,
and dropped slightly to $186.1 billion by June, 1975. Consumer Credit Statistics, THE
WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 71 (1976). The amount of credit outstanding per
individual is based upon a United States population of 212.8 million, as estimated by
Vincent P. Barabba, director of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, as of Jan. 1, 1975.
Barabba, United States Population, THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 201 (1976).
14. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, A GUIDE TO CONSUMER MARKETS 1975/76 at 148
(1975). Since 1968, The Conference Board illustrated the difference between the
amounts of installment credit extended and repaid by the following table:
[Vol. 17
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been estimated at approximately $2,000 per household in the
country."
As is apparent from these figures, the consumer credit in-
dustry is "big business." As a result, collection remedies, espe-
cially wage garnishment, have increased in importance. No
national statistics on the exact numbers of wage garnishments
are kept since the procedure is handled by thousands of frag-
mented local courts, but a study in Chicago revealed a jump
in garnishments in that city from 64,000 in 1960 to 78,000 in
1969."6 Although the growth of credit has stimulated the econ-
omy and raised the standard of living by giving the average
consumer a discretionary source of buying power he never be-
fore enjoyed, the continually increasing number of garnish-
ments attest to the social problems attached to such growth.
The overextended or defaulting debtor is the unfortunate by-
product of a nation which has gone virtually credit-happy.
Because garnishment has become so powerful a creditor
Installment Credit Extended And Repaid
(Billions of dollars)
Extended Repaid Net Change
1968 100.0 91.7 8.3
1969 109.1 99.8 9.4
1970 112.2 107.2 5.0
1971 124.3 115.0 9.2
1972 143.0 126.9 16.0
1973 165.1 145.0 20.1
1974 166.5 157.8 8.7
15. D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 1
(1974) [hereinafter cited as CAPLOVITZ]. Installment credit as of June, 1975, excluding
mortgage debts and noninstallment debts such as charge accounts, totalled $152.7
billion. Consumer Credit Statistics, THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 71 (1976).
Caplovitz used $129 billion as the basis of his estimate.
16. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 15, at 1. The number of garnishments in Chicago
reached a peak of 87,000 in 1966. Id.
The Cook County Circuit Court in Chicago issued 84,513 garnishments in 1965,
representing a 15% increase over the number issued in 1964 and 72% more than in 1961.
In Los Angeles County, the marshal of the municipal courts served 114,972 wage
garnishments in 1965, an increase of 6% over 1964. Garnishments in early 1966 in Los
Angeles County were running at an annual rate of 122,000. Consumer Credit Protection
Act: Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 765 (1967) (article by James
P. Gannon, staff reporter of the Wall Street Journal) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on H.R. 116011.
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remedy and because wages have been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court as a special type of property, 7 restric-
tions have been placed by both state and federal legislatures
on how much and under what circumstances a creditor can
deprive a debtor of his present salary to pay a past obligation.
RESTRICTIONS ON WAGE GARNISHMENT
Prejudgment
In June, 1969, the United States Supreme Court decided
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. and held that prejudgment
attachment of wages without notice and an opportunity to be
heard constituted a taking of property in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment." The Sniadach
decision marked the beginning of extensive constitutional at-
tacks on prejudgment creditor remedies throughout the coun-
try. Six months later, the California Supreme Court decided
McCallop v. Carberry'" and, on a procedural due process basis
similar to the one used by the United States Supreme Court
in Sniadach, struck down the California prejudgment wage
garnishment statute. 2 Not only was California's wage garnish-
ment statute declared unconstitutional, but the state's claim
and delivery and attachment laws were similarly held violative
of due process.2 ' The net effect is that prejudgment wage gar-
nishments are now unworkable.
17. In Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), a Wisconsin prejudg-
ment garnishment procedure which deprived plaintiff of her wages prior to notice and
opportunity to be heard was held to be violative of due process absent any extraordi-
nary circumstances. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, said, "We deal here
with wages, a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic
system." Id. at 340.
18. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
19. 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970); see also Cline v. Credit
Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970).
20. At the time of McCallop, California Civil Procedure Code §§ 537 and 538
provided that a writ of attachment could be issued upon wages to the limit of the
exemption provided for in § 690.11 without a judgment or judicial hearing. The Califor-
nia legislature responded to the McCallop decision and added § 690.6 to the Code of
Civil Procedure; its purpose was to exempt from levy of statement "all earnings" of
the debtor derived from his personal services. 1970 Cal. Stats. ch. 1523, § 19. See note
29 infra for text of § 690.6.
For a summary of pre-amendment California garnishment procedures, see Brunn,
Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REv.
1214 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Brunn[.
21. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (repossession without prior notice
and hearing held unconstitutional); Hernadez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487
F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973) (bailee's lien held unconstitutional); Beaudreau v. Superior
[Vol. 17
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Postjudgment: Federal Law
In 1968, postjudgment garnishment procedure became the
subject of federal legislative action when Congress enacted
Title III of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act.22 Re-
flective of the congressional concern behind its enactment,
Title III excluded from garnishment either 75% of a person's
disposable earnings or thirty times the federal minimum hourly
wage-whichever afforded the debtor greater protection." With
Court, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1975) (pre-trial posting of costs
under California Government Code §§ 947 and 951 held unconstitutional); Adams v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974)
(garagemen's liens permitting foreclosure and sale on a customer's car without a prior
hearing held unconstitutional); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d
13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972) (former California Civil
Procedure Code § 537(1), authorizing attachment without prior hearing on an express
or implied contract for the payment of money, held unconstitutional); Blair v. Pit-
chess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) (claim and delivery statutes
held unconstitutional); Damazo v. MacIntyre, 26 Cal. App. 3d 18, 102 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1972) (former California Civil Procedure Code § 537(4) authorizing attachment in
unlawful detainer actions for unpaid rent held unconstitutional, but former § 537(3),
authorizing attachment in tort actions against nonresidents found constitutional);
People v. Allstate Leasing Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 973, 101 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1972) (former
California Civil Procedure Code § 537(5) held unconstitutional to the extent it permit-
ted the state to use attachment in a collection action on a statutory obligation pen-
alty); Gray v. Whitmore, 14 Cal. App. 3d 784, 92 Cal. Rptr. 505, vacated, 17 Cal. App.
3d 1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971) (landlord's lien held unconstitutional); National Gen.
Corp. v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 490, 93 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1971)
(former California Civil Procedure Code § 537(2) authorizing attachment in contract
actions held unconstitutional).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1970). Congress claimed authority under both the
commerce clause and bankruptcy clause of the Constitution to enact Title III. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8; see Hodgson v. Hamilton Mun. Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Ohio
1972) (provisions of Title III restricting garnishment by states held constitutional). For
a discussion of the constitutionality of Title III see Note, Federal Restrictions of Wage
Garnishment: Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 44 IND. L.J. 267, 269-
76 (1969)[hereinafter cited as Note, Federal Restrictions].
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1970), provides in relevant part:
(a) [Tihe maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of
an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may
not exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week ex-
ceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by section
206(a) (1) of Title 29 in effect at the time the earnings are payable,
whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a
week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of
the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth
in paragraph (2).
15 U.S.C. § 1672 (1970) provides definitions for § 1673:
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the current minimum wage of $2.30 per hour, 4 if a worker earns
$69 or less per week he is not subject to garnishment in any
amount. If earnings are between $69 and $92, a creditor can
only take the amount by which a debtor's earnings exceed $69.
If disposable earnings are above $92, the "25 percent rule" is
applicable.5 The definitions of "earnings," "disposable earn-
ings" and "garnishment" have been the subject of much litiga-
tion. For example, "garnishment," as defined in section
1672(c) of Title III does not include wage assignments which
were brought about by negotiation between the parties and
subsequently implemented without judicial intervention."
"Earnings" and "disposable earnings" are confined to periodic
payments of compensation and do not pertain to every asset
that is in some way traceable to such compensation. In deter-
mining whether money due a person constitutes "earnings"
under section 1672(a) of Title III, the courts are not concerned
with conclusory labels such as wages, salary or commission; the
sole criterion for exemption is that the money subject to gar-
nishment represent compensation for personal services in a
strict sense. 7 "Disposable earnings," according to section
For the purposes of this subchapter:
(a) The term "earnings" means compensation paid or payable for
personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission,
bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pen-
sion or retirement program.
(b) The term "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings
of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of
any amounts required by law to be withheld.
(c) The term "garnishment" means any legal or equitable proce-
dure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be
withheld for payment of any debt.
24. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a) (West Supp. 1975).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 870.10(b) (1971).
26. Western v. Hodgson, 494 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1974); [1975] 1 LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) Wage and Hour Cas. 22,501.65.
27. For example, one state court has held that a lessor of transportation equip-
ment, who was not paid wages, salary or commission but has received a fixed percen-
tage of revenue derived from shipments, and whose employment status was one of
independent contractor rather than employee, did not receive any compensation for
personal services and thus had no "earnings" under § 1672(a). Therefore, the entire
amount due to the lessor was subject to garnishment rather than only 25% as provided
under § 1673(a)(1). Gerry Elson Agency, Inc. v. Muck, 509 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974). Benefits and pensions paid the debtor and his wife under programs of the
Veterans Administration, Social Security Administration and county welfare depart-
ment and deposited in debtor's checking account have been held not "earnings" and
not subject to garnishment restrictions. Phillips v. Bartolomie, 46 Cal. App. 3d 346,
121 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1975). A bankruptcy trustee has been held to have the right to treat
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1672(b), are earnings remaining after the deduction of any
amounts required by law to be withheld. Federal income tax
and social security payments are deductible because they are
specifically required by federal law,2" but union dues or repay-
ments of credit union loans are not deductions required by
either federal or state law to be withheld and therefore are part
of disposable earnings.29 Similarly, amounts withheld for un-
employment compensation and workmen's compensation in-
surance pursuant to state law are also allowable deductions."'
Since the Secretary of Labor is given the power of enforcing
Title III in section 1676, wage and hour opinion letters also
provide guidance in interpretation. Such administrative con-
structions are entitled to great weight by the courts."
Section 1673(b) of Title III specifically excludes from gar-
nishment restrictions any court-ordered support payments,
any court-ordered bankruptcy under Chapter XIII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and any debt due for any state or federal tax. How-
ever, if child support payments, for example, should amount
to more than 25% of an individual's wages per week, this would
preclude any additional garnishment in the same week.2
Title III forbids an employer from discharging an employee
because of wage garnishments resulting from "any one indebt-
edness."33 However, if a second garnishment proceeding results
an entire tax refund to a bankrupt wage earner as property of the bankrupt's estate
without regard to garnishment restrictions since a tax refund is not the equivalent of
"earnings." Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974), aff'g 479 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1973).
28. [19751 1 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) Wage and Hour Cas. 22,501.156.
29. Id. 22,501.15.
30. Id. 22,501.155.
31. Brennan v. Kroger Co., 513 F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Cedor, 337 F. Supp.
1103 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The following are illustrative of such administrative rulings on
what constitutes "earnings" under § 1672(a): (1) tips which pass through the hands of
the employer-garnishee, [1975] 1 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) Wage and Hour Cas.
22,501.158; (2) lump sum payments to artists and writers after a determination is
made of the number of workweeks spent on the product, id. 22,501.159; (3) sick pay,
id. 22,501.161; (4) earnings deposited in a debtor's bank account as long as they can
be identified as such under the circumstances of the particular case, id. 22,501.175.
32. [1975] 1 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) Wage and Hour Cas. 22,501.201.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1970). The Wage-Hour Administrator has interpreted
the term "one indebtedness" to mean a single debt regardless of the number of levies
made or the number of proceedings brought for its collection. [1975] 1 LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) Wage and Hour Cas. 22,501.60. In the opinion of the Administrator, the
protection of Title III with respect to discharge for one indebtedness is renewed with
each employment, since the new employer would not yet have been a garnishee and
would have suffered no inconvenience by the previous garnishment. Discharge for a
second garnishment, after a considerable length of time has elapsed, may be unlawful
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from a separate debt, the employee can be legally discharged.
A state may be exempt from federal regulation if it enacts
laws of its own "substantially similar" to Title III." Even if
total exemption from federal regulation is not granted to a
state, federal law will not supersede any state garnishment law
which offers more protection to the debtor. 5 The legislative
purpose of Title III was to set minimum standards with regard
to garnishment but not necessarily to preempt state authority
in the area."
since the lapse of time could make the first garnishment no longer a material consider-
ation. Id. 22,501.60.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (1970). Under § 1675, the Secretary of Labor may exempt
a state from federal garnishment restrictions if it is determined that the laws of that
state are "substantially similar" to those provided by § 1673(a). Laws are considered
substantially similar if they cover "every case of garnishment covered by the Act[Title IIII, and if these laws provide the same or greater protection to individuals."
29 C.F.R. § 870.51(a) (1972). It is noteworthy that ten states have applied for exemp-
tion, but only Kentucky and Virginia have qualified. Dept's of Labor & Health, Educa-
tion & Welfare Appropriations for 1973: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1972) (Title III restrictions on
garnishment; states' compliance with garnishment regulations).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (1970).
36. Title III itself states its purpose as threefold: (1) to discourage predatory
extensions of credit relying on garnishment as a remedy; (2) to discourage discharge
from employment because of garnishment; and (3) to promote uniformity of bank-
ruptcy laws. 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1)-(3) (1970). See Gerry Elson Agency, Inc. v. Muck,
509 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
With respect to the minimum standard concept, Senator Proxmire's remarks are
illustrative of the legislative intent behind Title III: "In effect the Federal Government
has set minimum standards. The provision has not automatically preempted the
State's authority to legislate on the subject." 114 CONG. REC. 14488 (1968).
In contrast to the minimum standard concept is the aim of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UCCC) which would wholly supplant state garnishment laws once en-
acted by that state. The UCCC provides for wage garnishments to be limited to the
lesser of the amount exceeding forty times the federal minimum wage or 75% of wages
for each workweek. UCCC § 5.105(2)(b). These restrictions apply only when the
garnishment is used to coerce payment of a judgment arising out of a consumer credit
sale, consumer loan or consumer lease. See generally Curran, Administration and En-forcement Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 737(1968); Fritz, Would the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25
Bus. LAw 511 (1970); Johnson, Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, HARv. Bus. REv.,
July-Aug., 1968, at 119; Note, Administration of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
8 IND. L. REv. 828 (1975); Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Protection
Act and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 338 (1969). The UCCC
also restricts deficiency judgements and forbids discharge from employment no matter
how many garnishments or debts are involved. UCCC §§ 5.101-.106.
The UCCC has been adopted by Colorado (1971), Idaho (1971), Indiana (1971),
Iowa (1974), Kansas (1974), Maine (1975), Oklahoma (1969), Utah (1969) and Wyo-
ming (1971) (effective dates). However, some states, such as Indiana, Colorado, Kan-
sas and Oklahoma have changed the UCCC alternative minimum exemptions to 75%
or thiry times the federal minimum hourly wage.
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Title III does not provide for any criminal penalties except
against the employer for his unlawful discharge of an em-
ployee." There is no criminal penalty imposed for garnishment
in excess of the federal restrictions, but there is some authority
to suggest that an implied private cause of action may lie to
recover damages caused by illegal discharge or excessive gar-
nishment. In Stewart v. Travelers Corp., a 1974 Ninth Circuit
decision,3" an employee discharged due to garnishment of his
wages for one indebtedness was held to have an implied private
civil remedy since he was within the class that the statute was
designed to protect and his discharge was the type of harm
which the statute was designed to prevent. The court held that
the private civil action could be implied despite the fact that
alternative remedies existed under federal statute or the fact
that enforcement was specifically vested in the Secretary of
Labor. In granting the plaintiff reinstatement to his job, recov-
ery of back pay, punitive damages and attorney's fees for being
illegally discharged, the Stewart court found that nothing in
Title III evidenced a clear congressional intent against private
actions for civil remedies and that the criminal sanctions and
administrative enforcement expressly authorized in Title III
did not adequately protect the statutory interest of the dis-
charged employee. Several district courts,3" however, have re-
fused to imply a private right of action, leaving enforcement of
Title Ill exclusively with the wage and hour division of the
United States Department of Labor.40
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(b) (1970). The penalty for violation of § 1674(a) is a $1,000
fine or imprisonment for up to one year.
38. 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974).
39. Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.W.Va. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 379
(4th Cir. 1974); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La. 1972),
vacated, 488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973); Oldham v. Oldham, 337 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D.
Iowa 1972); Sutton v. Hodgson, 71 Lab. Cas. 32,886 (D. Ohio 1972); Higgins v. Wilker-
son, 63 Lab. Cas. 32,379 (D. Kan. 1970); Hooter v. Wilson, 273 So. 2d 516 (La. 1973).
But see Nunn v. City of Paducah, 367 F. Supp. 957 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
40. Enforcement of Title III is left exclusively to the Secretary of Labor under §
1676; but the Department of Labor is not a party to any state garnishment proceedings
and is, therefore, not in a position to discover violations. As a result, enforcement of
Title III is almost wholly dependent upon the awareness and knowledge of the em-
ployee it attempts to protect. See, e.g., Comment, California Garnishment, supra note
5, at 73-76; Note, Federal Restrictions, supra note 22, at 279-82; Note, The Implication
of a Private Right of Action Under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 47
S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (1974).
Further, the Secretary of Labor's enforcement of Title III appears to be discretion-
ary. Section 1676 of Title III provides that the Secretary of Labor shall enforce the
Act through the wage and hour division. The wage and hour division is regulated by
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Postjudgment: California Law
The 1970 and 1972 amendments to California's existing
garnishment laws produced no sweeping reforms." By passage
of Title III, the previous California minimum exemption of 50%
of a debtor's earnings was forced upward to meet the federal
minimum requirement of 75%.42 The state protective require-
ment that a creditor notify an employee within eight days of
garnishment of his wages was rewritten to require that notice
of post judgment execution of wages be sent to the debtor on
the same day the garnishment is authorized. The notice must
inform the debtor that he may be entitled to an exemption
from execution, may seek counsel, and that he has ten days to
deliver an affidavit to the levying officer claiming such an ex-
emption.44 California law retained a 100% exemption if the
debtor could prove that all of his earnings4" were necessary for
the support of his family residing in the state.4"
the Fair Labor Standards Act, which provides that the Administrator may investigate
and bring suit. 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970). The existence of this discretion has been
confirmed by at least one court. Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651 (D.C.
Cir. 1959). But see Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La. 1972)
(emphasizing language that "Secretary shall enforce" provisions of Title III).
41. See note 20 supra.
42. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.6(a) (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added) pro-
vides in relevant part:
(a) One-half or such greater portion as is allowed by statute of the
United States, of the earnings of the debtor received for his or her per-
sonal services rendered at any time within 30 days next proceeding the
date of a with-holding by the employer under Section 682.3, shall be
exempt from execution without filing a claim for exemption as provided
in Section 690.50.
Prior to January 1, 1977, this same text was in § 690.6(b).
43. Id. § 682.1.
44. Id.
45. Only earnings incurred thirty days preceding the levy are eligible for exemp-
tion. Id. § 690.6(a), (b); LeFont v. Rankin, 167 Cal. App. 2d 433, 334 P.2d 608 (1959).
46. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.6(b) (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added) pro-
vides:
(b) All earnings of the debtor received for his or her personal services
rendered at any time within 30 days next preceding the date of a with-
holding by the employer under Section 682.3, if necessary for the use of
the debtor's family residing in this state and supported in whole or in part
by the debtor, unless the debts are:
(1) Incurred by the debtor, his or her spouse, or his or her family
for the common necessaries of life.
(2) Incurred for personal services rendered by any employee or for-
mer employee of the debtor.
Prior to January 1, 1977, this text was § 690.6(c).
The determination of what is "necessary for the use of a debtor's family" under §
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The right to the 100% exemption, however, remained sub-
ject to two exceptions. First, if the debt was incurred for per-
sonal services rendered to the debtor by an employee or former
employee, the 100% exemption is lost. 7 Second, if the debt was
incurred by the debtor, his spouse, or his family for the
"common necessaries of life," the 100% exemption is not al-
lowed even though the debtor could show that all his earnings
were needed to support his family." The avowed purpose of this
exception was to guarantee to those creditors extending credit
for "common necessaries" that at least some part of a debtor's
salary above the minimum would be subject to garnishment
and to encourage such creditors to be more liberal in giving
credit for such necessary items. Determining what is a common
necessary does not involve subjective considerations-it is
objectively based upon what is necessary to sustain life for
anyone. 9 The phrase "common necessaries of life" approaches
690.6(b) involves consideration of all the circumstances of that particular debtor,
including his station in life and his particular type of employment. Among the items
which have been held to be expenses which qualify as necessary for the use of the
debtor's family are the following: small sums for music lessons and recreation, insur-
ance for wife and children, social security and unemployment reserves withheld by an
employer, Sanker v. Humborg, 48 Cal. App. 2d 295, 119 P.2d 621 (1941); money spent
on behalf of daughter attending college, Diamond v. Brent, 157 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
857, 320 P.2d 621 (1957); medical care, Simoneau v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 159 Cal. 494,
115 P. 320 (1911); Medical Fin. Ass'n v. Short, 36 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 745, 173 P. 176
(1939); dental services, Smith v. Bentson, 127 Cal. App. Supp. 789, 15 P.2d 910 (1939);
a watch, In re Estate of Millington, 63 Cal. App. 498, 218 P. 1022 (1923); a fur coat,
Bay Dist. Claim Serv. v. Jones, 136 Cal. App. Supp. 789, 24 P.2d 977 (1933); domestic
services, Winsom v. McCarthy, 48 Cal. App. 697, 192 P. 337 (1920); services of a nurse,
Davis v. Fyfe, 107 Cal App. 281, 290 P. 468 (1930); Heaton v. Justice's Court, 19 Cal.
App. 2d 118, 64 P.2d 1004 (1937); legal services to an incompetent, Stone v. Conkle,
31 Cal. App. 2d 348, 88 P.2d 197 (1939).
47. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 690.6(b)(2) (West Supp. 1977) (prior to January 1,
1977, this section was 690.6(c)(2)). See note 46 supra. This exemption has an extremely
limited effect, since few debtor-garnishees are employers.
48. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 690.6(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977) (prior to January 1,
1977, this was § 690.6(c)(1)). See note 46 supra.
Common necessaries has been held to mean only those items, which, "in the hands
of anyone," are necessary to sustain life, such as food, heat and shelter. Los Angeles
Fin. Co. v. Flores, 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850, 856, 243 P.2d 139, 143-44 (1952); see
Ratzlaff v. Portillo, 14 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 92 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1971) (automobile, al-
though great convenience, not necessary in view of availability of public transporta-
tion, home delivery service and neighborhood shopping centers); Carpenter v. Trujillo,
275 Cal. App. 2d 1021, 79 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1969) (medical expenses held common
necessaries; encyclopedias not); Lentfoehr v. Lentfoehr, 134 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 905,
286 P.2d 1019 (1955) (debt to former wife for attorney's fees and court costs in divorce
action not one for common necessaries).
49. Los Angeles Fin. Co. v. Flores, 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850, 856, 243 P.2d 139,
143-44 (1952).
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the strict common law definition of the term necessaries which
included food, drink, clothing, housing, washing and medical
care only.'" Thus, two separate steps are involved before a 100%
exemption can be claimed. First, the debtor must show that all
of his earnings are necessary for the support of his family. If
this is established, then the debtor must show that the debt
involved was not for the common necessaries of life. If both
requirements are met, only then is the debtor entitled to a
100% exemption. The favored policy of the courts is to construe
exemptions (what is necessary for support of the debtor's fam-
ily) liberally and exceptions (common necessaries of life)
strictly.'
The lengthy procedure a debtor must follow to claim a
100% exemption was not substantially changed by a 1974
amendment and still remains cumbersome and time consum-
ing." In 1972, the system of costly multiple levies to satisfy ajudgment was replaced with a provision that allowed a levy of
execution to remain in effect for ninety days. 3
50. White v. Gobey, 130 Cal. App. Supp. 789, 19 P.2d 876 (1933); Sumner v.
Mohn, 47 Cal. App. 142, 190 P. 368 (1920); Evans v. Noonan, 20 Cal. App. 288, 128 P.
794 (1912). One commentator suggests that the reason there are so few reported deci-
sions on the meaning of common necessaries is that few debtors can afford to litigate
this issue. Brunn, supra note 20. See, e.g., Seid, Necessaries-Common or Otherwise,
14 HASTINCS L.J. 28 (1962).
51. Perfection Paint Prod. v. Johnson, 164 Cal. App. 2d 739, 330 P.2d 829 (1958);
5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 64, at 3440 (2d ed. 1971).
52. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.50 (West Supp. 1977). Section 690.50 was
amended in 1974 to give the debtor twenty days in the case of real property described
in § 690.235 and ten days in the case of all other property to deliver an affidavit to the
levying officer claiming an exemption. The levying officer will send a copy of the claim
to the creditor who then has five days to file a counteraffidavit (ten days in the case
of real property described in § 690.235). Id. § 690.50(c). If there is no counteraffidavit
filed by the creditor, the property must be released by the levying officer. Id. §
690.50(d). If a counteraffidavit is filed, either party may make a motion within five
days for a hearing. Id. § 690.50(e). After the motion is made, a hearing must be held
within fifteen days unless continued for good cause. Id. At the hearing the debtor
claiming the exemption has the burden of proof. If the claim to the exemption is
granted, the debtor is entitled to release of his earnings within three days. Id. §
690.50(j).
53. Id. § 682.3(4).
Prior to the enactment of § 682.3(4), a separate writ of execution had to be served
for each wage withholding and the costs became prohibitive. See, e.g., Recommen-
dation Relating to Attachment, Garnishment, and Exemptions from Execution:
Employee's Earnings Protection Law, published in 10 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION
COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 701, 710 n.6 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as LAW REVISION COMM'N, Garnishment Recommendation]. Section 682.3(4) provides
for the writ to remain effective for ninety days. Under this section the judgment debtor
can claim an exemption of all his earnings before the ninety-day period or at anytime
during the ninety-day period upon a showing of changed circumstances, even if the
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To assess what effect Title III and California's garnish-
ment laws have had and the extent to which those laws tear
into our social fabric for the economic benefit they produce, it
is necessary to know who the default-debtors being garnished
are and what happens to them as the result of garnishment.
DEFAULT-DEBTORS: WHO AND WHY
The vast majority of Americans pay back their debts-in
fact, defaults constitute only two percent of all consumer credit
transactions.54 However, because of the phenomenal growth of
consumer credit, this seemingly small percentage involves bil-
lions of dollars. 5 A 1967 study by David Caplovitz5 revealed
that of 1,331 default-debtors appearing on court records from
New York, Chicago, Detroit and Philadelphia, the typical
default-debtor was likely to be marginally poor,5 7 underedu-
cated,58 young,"9 a member of a minority,"0 and either employed
in a blue-collar occupation or unemployed. 1Of those debtors
comprising the study group, Caplovitz found that most of the
debtor was denied such an exemption prior to the start of the period. Further, the
judgment creditor who is barred by a continuing exemption can terminate the debtor's
exempt status by showing "changed circumstances." See Comment, Wage Garnish-
ment: Legislative Review, 4 PAC. L.J. 293, 294 (1973). The debtor can be charged with
a marshal's fee of $8.50 per levy for serving the writ, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 26734 (West
Supp. 1977), and a clerk's fee of $4.00 for issuing the writ, id. § 26828 (West 1968).
54. CAPLOvrrz, supra note 15, at 291.
55. In 1975, consumer credit was estimated at $186.1 billion; a 2% rate of default
would leave $3.72 billion unpaid. See note 13 supra.
56. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 15.
57. Id. at 15. Fifty-four percent of the default-debtors had annual incomes be-
tween $4,000 and $8,000.
In a study conducted by the National Opinion Research Center in 1967, 43% of
all credit users were found to have annual incomes between $4,000 and $8,000.
58. Thirty-nine percent of the default-debtors had a high school education, as
opposed to 52% of the general population, and 11% had some college education. Id. at
18.
59. Forty-five percent were found to be under thirty-five years of age and non-
farm family heads. Credit users as a group were generally younger-38% were under
thirty-five while only 25% of the general population was under thirty-five. Thirty
percent of the debtors were between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four. Id. at 19.
60. The black population in the four cities studied (in New York, the study
included both blacks and Puerto Ricans) comprised from 18-34% of the total city
population, but 65% of the default-debtors were black. Whites comprised 64-72% of
the total population but constituted 28% of the default-debtors. Whites constituted
85% of credit users as a group and blacks 15%. Id. at 20.
61. Most of the debtors were from the lower levels of blue-collar occupations with
incomes below what is considered adequate in major urban areas. Twenty-five percent
of the debtors were unemployed at the time of default. Id. at 17-18.
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debts were incurred for durable goods" and that seventy per-
cent were incurred under conditional sale contracts. 3 A Los
Angeles study further evidenced that most of the sales were
made at stores catering to consumers with below-average in-
comes. Forty percent of the debtors in that study reported that,
at the time credit was extended, they were not even asked if
they had any other outstanding debts. 4
Myths as to why people are default-debtors persist-the
general public believes that all people who fail to pay their
debts are "deadbeats," simply trying to evade the law, to get
something for nothing. Caplovitz found that only one percent
met this stereotype and were guilty of bad faith. 5 He labelled
five percent as "irresponsible" for their failure to pay because
of bad faith, forgetfulness, lapse of payment while out of town,
or refusal to pay because their merchandise was stolen or de-
stroyed. The primary reason why debts were not repaid was
unexpected loss of income, while the second most popular rea-
son was voluntary overextension. 7 The former applied to 43%
of Caplovitz' subjects and the latter to 25%. The real cause of
trouble in the overextended group usually was inability to keep
up with payments because of some unexpected crisis. Fourteen
percent cited fraud and deception as the primary reason for
their default, while 35% implicated the creditor. 8 Of those who
cited loss of income as the primary reason for their default,
more than 25% lost their jobs, were laid off or forced on shorter
work weeks, while another 16% became ill."9 Because of the
above, Caplovitz concluded that two out of every five debtors
defaulted because of unexpected hardships imposed by unem-
62. CAPLOvrrz, supra note 15, at 30. Purchases were broken down into the follow-
ing percentages: 26% automobiles, 20% furniture, 13% appliances, 11% entertainment
appliances (including televisions, radios and stereos), 16% soft goods, and 10% per-
sonal accessories (including jewelry, watches, wigs, etc.). Id.
63. Id. at 28-29.
64. WESTERN CENTER ON LAW & POVERTY, WAGE GARNISHMENT-IMPACT AND Ex-
TENT IN Los ANGELES CoUNTY 3 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Los ANGELES STUDY]. An
FrC report on installment credit and retail sales practices occurring in the District of
Columbia found that, 70% of the retailers studied said they used no credit references
or, if used, then references only with other low-income retailers. Id. at 11, citing FTC,
ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA RETAILERS 7 (1968).
65. CAPLOVI-Z, supra note 15, at 59.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 54.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 57.
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ployment and illness.7 °
The average default-debtor, therefore, is not someone who
has calculated all the angles and is trying to "beat" the credit
system. He is a person who has not considered all the conse-
quences of buying on credit and has erroneously assumed that
his earning ability will remain unchanged in the future. When
the unexpected does occur and the wage earner finds himself
laid off, sick or out of work, he suddenly finds himself unable
to meet his installment committments. It is primarily the poor
and undereducated consumer whose only answer to an unex-
pected financial reversal is default.
GARNISHMENT: AN INEFFICIENT COLLECTION DEVICE
Not only does garnishment prey upon members of society
who are least likely to be able to withstand its personal and
financial consequences, but it is also an inefficient and indis-
criminate collection remedy. Garnishment procedure exacts
payment by yielding an axe when the nature of the problem
demands a surgeon's scalpel.
The garnishment procedure is time-consuming7 and ex-
pensive. An employer must decide what amount of his em-
ployee's salary can be classified as "disposable earnings '"72 and
then use the appropriate formula to decide how much of that
is exempt. The Los Angeles study estimated that the procedure
cost employers an average of $19.36 per garnishment-about
$1.8 million annually in Los Angeles alone.73 Added to this cost
are the state costs in serving the writs7" and the court costs in
adjudicating the procedure. It is estimated that filing fees,
70. Id. at 59.
71. Caplovitz found that, although 68% of the debt-causing transactions took
place within two years of his interviews (the interviews occurred within four to eight
months after cases were filed in court docket books), some 31% of the cases had begun
three or more years before. Id. at 34-35.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(b) (1970). See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
73. Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 5. Caplovitz estimated the cost to be
higher-$22.24 per garnishment. CAPLOVrrz, supra note 15, at 237 n.10. Illustrative of
the high costs involved in garnishment proceedings is Boeing Corporation's (in Seattle,
Washington) estimate that it spent over $200,000 per year and served 500 writs each
month. See Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43
WASH. L. REv. 743, 755-56 (1968).
In another study, the Cook County Credit Bureau in Chicago surveyed 1,100
employers in 1964 and found that processing a single garnishment costs a company
from $15 to $35 and that the total annual cost of such garnishments to the surveyed
employers was $12 million. Hearings on H.R. 11601, supra note 16, at 766.
74. See note 53 supra.
19771
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
court costs, added interest and attorney's fees comprise 9% of
a garnishee's debt liabilities over $1,000 and 31% for liabilities
under $200.11 Furthermore, a Chicago survey, revealed that the
average recovery through garnishment was a mere $145.42
while the average debt outstanding was $417.29.11 It appears
that garnishment is not only an inefficient collection device,
but its procedural costs soar at a rate which is inversely propor-
tional to the amount of the debt.
Garnishment is most often defended on the grounds that
it is a necessary concomitant to the extension and growth of
credit and that it is the only effective means by which a credi-
tor can collect debts. These defenses are illusory at best. The
fact that complete or very liberal wage exemptions do not affect
the extension of credit in any significant degree has been
proven convincingly." Caplovitz' study found that the percen-
tage of debtors repaying their debts did not vary significantly
whether or not garnishment existed as a collection remedy. 8 In
the cities allowing garnishment, Caplovitz found that 63% of
the non-garnisheed default-debtors either paid in full or re-
sumed payments. In Philadelphia, where garnishment was
not allowed, 69% of the default-debtors paid in full or resumed
payments.2 As would be expected, in New York, Chicago and
Detroit, cities allowing garnishment, those garnisheed were
much more likely to repay than those who were not."' However,
of those who were subject to garnishment but instead elected
75. See Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 4.
76. Note, Wage Garnishment: Remedy or Revenge?, 5 Loy. CI. L.J. 140, 152
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Wage Garnishment].
77. See, e.g., Brunn, supra note 20, at 1240-43; Note, Wage Garnishment, supra
note 76, at 152-55. As evidence that the extension of credit was not reduced by the
enactment of Title I, note the following excerpt:
Between 1966 and 1970 consumer credit grew from 96.2 billion dollars to
127.2 billion dollars, a growth of 30.9 billion, a rate of 7.7 billion dollars
per year. After enactment of the CCPA [Consumer Credit Protection
Act] Title III, consumer credit grew at an unprecedented pace. By 1972,
consumer credit had grown to a level of 157.6 billion dollars for a growth
rate of 15.2 billion dollars per year. In other words, after the enactment
of the more restrictive garnishment laws, the expansion of credit in-
creased 97 percent.
Id. at 154, citing FED. RES. BULL. A-54 (1973).
78. CAPLovTrz, supra note 15, at 225-55.
79. Id. at 250. The cities were New York, Chicago and Detroit.
80. Id. at 251.
81. Id. table 12.11. Of those who were garnisheed and accepted their debt as
legitimate, 82% repaid while only 58% of the same group, but not garnisheed, repaid.
Of those who felt unsatisfied or cheated, 63% of those garnisheed repaid, while only
38% of the non-garnisheed repaid. Id.
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to settle payment of their debt, only 38% were satisfied that the
settlement was fair, whereas 62% of those not garnisheed felt
their settlement was fair. 2 Caplovitz found that garnishment
was indeed a powerful remedy once it was held over the head
of the debtor; so powerful, in fact, that many debtors accepted
a settlement they felt was unfair rather than run the gamut of
the garnishment procedure. The Philadelphia study disclosed
the apparent anomaly that garnishment was often unnecessary
since many of these same debtors (69%) would have repaid
voluntarily, especially if the debt was considered legitimately
incurred."3
While it would seem that there should be no reason why
one default-debtor should be more likely to be garnisheed than
another, the Caplovitz study illustrated that lower-income
blue-collar workers as opposed to white-collar workers; that
those workers earning under $8,000 per year as opposed to those
earning more; that blacks and Puerto Ricans as opposed to
whites; and that employees in the private sector as opposed to
those in the public sector were significantly more likely to be
garnisheed than their fellow default-debtors. 4 A Los Angeles
study found that installment debtors with annual incomes
under $5,000 were more than three-and-one-half times as likely
to be sued for their debts as those with incomes above that
amount.8 5
Stripped of wage garnishment, creditors would certainly
not throw their hands up in helplessness. Over the years, an
array of remedies has inured to the creditor's advantage, in-
cluding attachment and execution, skip tracing, repossession,
liens and levies against automobiles, bank accounts and
homes, and judicial examination of debtors."
One must question what kind of creditor would be most
82. Id. at 245.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 233-43. Caplovitz' research was indeed revealing; for example, 52% of
low-income blue-collar debtors were garnisheed versus 37% of the higher-income white-
collar workers. In addition, 50% of black debtors were garnisheed as compared to only
36% of white debtors. Even when the type of plaintiff was held constant, blacks were
garnisheed more frequently. Forty-eight percent of those privately employed were gar-
nisheed, while 32% in the public sector were. Id.
85. Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 9. The study also found that 77% of
families making less that $3,000 annually at that time did not have installment debts
since they could not get credit in the first place. Id.
86. See, e.g., Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A
Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REv. 155, 181 (1957); note 9 supra.
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hurt by the abolition of wage garnishment. The most frequent
"creditor" using wage garnishment to satisfy a judgment is the
collection agency-the Los Angeles study revealed that 75% of
the garnishments were brought by such agencies. 7 Caplovitz
found, in addition, that 60% of the default-debtors initially
subjected to a great deal of harassment were garnisheed8 and
that 52% of those who felt highly deceived at the outset were
later garnisheed. 9 This led Caplovitz to classify the creditors
into two groups-one which used "high pressure tactics and
strong measures to collect their debts" versus one which was
"more ethical in their business dealings and less prone to resort
to harsh collection measures." 0 Garnishment, he found, was
more likely to be relied upon by the less ethical creditor who
extended credit primarily in reliance upon the garnishment
remedy rather than upon an adequate credit check. Caplovitz
concluded that the law seemed to place a powerful collection
weapon in the hands of high-pressure creditors who least de-
serve it."
SOCIAL COSTS OF WAGE GARNISHMENT
Prior to enactment of Title HI in 1968 and to the amend-
ments to the California garnishment statutes in 1970, commen-
tators warned of the harsh effects of wage garnishment.2 One
cautiously predicted Title HI would solve many of the economic
ills produced by garnishment. 3 Others advocated further major
reforms" and some called for total abolition of wage garnish-
87. See Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 4.
88. CAPLOVIrZ, supra note 15, at 236.
89. Only 38% of the default-debtors who experienced little or no harassment were
garnisheed. Where there was little or no deception at the outset, 43% were eventually
garnisheed. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., CAPLOVITZ, supra note 15; Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64;
Brunn, supra note 20; Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MINN.
L. REv. 1 (1942); Patterson, Foreward: Wage Garnishment-An Extraordinary Remedy
Run Amuk, 43 WASH. L. REv. 735 (1968); Comment, Garnishment of Wages in Pennsyl-
vania- Its History and Rationale, 70 DICK. L. Rxv. 199, 211 (1966); Note, Garnishment
in Kentucky-Some Defects, 45 KY. L.J. 322 (1957); Comment, Wage Garnishment
in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. Rav. 743 (1968); Note, Wage Gar-
nishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759.
93. Note, Federal Restrictions, supra note 22, at 292, where the following predic-
tion about Title El was made: "By eliminating exceptions to exemption coverage, and
by establishing a federal minimum standard for state exemptions, many of the present
economic evils of wage garnishment will be abolished."
94. See, e.g., Comment, California Garnishment, supra note 5; Comment, The
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ment 5 The California Law Revision Commission has repeat-
edly recommended sweeping reform of California's garnish-
ment and attachment laws but has been continually rebuffed
by the legislature."
The harsh social and economic effects of garnishment may
have been slightly reduced by federal or state legislation but
they have not been eliminated.
To effectively analyze the social cost of California's wage
garnishment laws, including the federal restrictions imposed
by Title III, one must consider the extent to which the effects
of the laws coincide with their stated or implied purpose. The
California Law Revision Commission has stated that the pri-
mary objective of garnishment laws is to secure adequate pro-
tection for the wage earner's day-to-day income. 7 Implicit in
Effect of the Wage Garnishment Provisions of the Consumer Protection Act upon State
Garnishment Laws, 9 Hous. L. REV. 537 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Effect
of Wage Garnishment].
95. See, e.g., Brunn, supra note 20, at 1248; Kerr, Wage Garnishment Should Be
Prohibited, 2 PROSPECTUS 371 (1969); Sweeney, Abolition of Wage Garnishment, 38
FORDHAM L. REV. 197, 223 (1969); Note, Wage Garnishment, supra note 76, at 157.
96. Recommendation Relating to Attachment, Garnishment, and Exemptions
from Execution: Employees Earnings Protection Law, published in 10 CALIFORNIA LAW
REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 701 (1971), was first submit-
ted to the legislature as Senate Bill 88 in 1972. The revised Recommendation Relating
to Wage Garnishment and Related Matters, published in 11 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION
COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 101 (1973), was then submitted to the
legislature as A.B. 101 and A.B. 102 by Assemblyman Warren and Senator Song. It
was subsequently amended and passed by the Assembly, only to die once again in the
Senate. The second revised recommendation, Recommendation Relating to Wage Gar-
nishment Exemptions, published in 12 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS,
RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 901 (1974), was submitted to the 1975 legislature as A.B.
90 and introduced by Assemblyman McAllister; but it, too, was not enacted. The latest
recommendation, Recommendation Relating to Wage Garnishment Procedure, to be
published in 13 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUD-
IES (1977), was submitted to the 1976 legislature.
The only success the commission has had with respect to wage garnishment reform
was the legislature's enactment of its 1971 Recommendation Relating to Attachment,
Garnishment and Exemptions from Execution: Discharge from Employment,
published in 10 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS &
STUDIES 1147 (1971). See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2929 (West Supp. 1977). The enactment of
this recommendation brought California in line with Title III by prohibiting discharge
from employment for threatened garnishment or one garnishment judgment and by
providing a civil penalty to aid in enforcement. See Law Revision Comm 'n Comment,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2929 (West Supp. 1977). Enactment of the recommendation also
slightly altered the wording of § 96 of the Labor Code to give the Labor Commissioner
enforcement over claims made by employees for loss of wages as the result of discharge
from employment for "the garnishment of wages" (rather than for "one garnishment
of wages prior to a final order of a court"). Law Revision Comm'n Comment, CAL. LAB.
CODE § 96 (West Supp. 1977).
97. The commission stated, "The primary objective of the garnishment measures
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this purpose is a qualification on the moral axiom that a man
owes a duty to repay his debts-that is, a man must also pro-
vide daily subsistence for himself and his family. Few would
argue that the rights of a creditor should take precedence over
the current needs of a debtor's child or spouse for food, shelter
and clothing. This point of view is furthered by statutory pro-
tections" providing restrictions and exemptions for certain
''necessary" amounts of a debtor's income so that he and his
family may continue to subsist and remain productive mem-
bers of the community. 9
Against this background, wage garnishment laws were
enacted with the hope of striking a balance between the eco-
nomic benefit of having creditors armed with this collection
device and the social costs these laws exact."" Congress, in
enacting Title III, implied by its stated legislative purposes
that making a man lose his job or fall into bankruptcy was too
high a social price to pay for having an efficient collection
device.'"' Similarly, California's garnishment law implies that
depriving a man of those things necessary to sustain life is too
high a social price for society to pay.'10 As seen below, garnish-
recently enacted at the state and federal levels has been to secure-through restrictions
on the amount which can be withheld-adequate protection for the wage-earner's day-
to-day income." LAW REvisION COMM'N, Garnishment Recommendation, supra note 53,
at 709.
98. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.6(b) (West Supp. 1977); see note 46
supra.
99. In Perfection Paint Prod. v. Johnson, 164 Cal. App. 2d 739, 330 P.2d 829
(1958), Judge Peters expressed such a view:
The basic theory of such exemption [that which is necessary for the
use of a debtor's family] is that a debtor and his family, regardless of
the debtor's improvidence, will retain enough money to maintain a basic
standard of living in order that the debtor may have a fair chance to
remain a productive member of the community.
Id. at 741, 330 P.2d at 830-31.
100. See Funk, The Wage Assignment and Garnishment as Collection Devices
for Small Loans 2-3 (1962) (unpublished paper on file in the Office of the Attorney
General, State Capitol, Madison, Wis.), cited in Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collec-
tion Device, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 759, 760. Social cost was defined by Funk as the
monetary response society must make to alleviate financial difficulties caused by wage
garnishment. Id. at 760 n.5.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)-(3) (1970); see note 36 supra. This section states that
Congress adted to restrict wage garnishment because of its finding that unrestricted
garnishment resulted in predatory extensions of credit, loss of employment by the
debtor and frustration of the purpose and uniformity of bankruptcy laws.
102. California allows 100% protection of a debtor's earnings if he can show such
wages are necessary for the support of his family and not incurred for the "common
necessaries of life." CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.6(b) (West Supp. 1977).
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ment costs the debtor and society more than the inefficient
device is worth.
Bankruptcy
There is little doubt that the harshness of garnishment
laws is strongly related to the number of personal bankrupt-
cies. 103 Referees in bankruptcy have cited wage garnishment as
the overriding factor in causing personal bankruptcies. 0 For-
103. See, e.g., Brunn, supra note 20, at 1234-38; Comment, Effect of Wage Gar-
nishments, supra note 94, at 539 n.15.
In 1971, the states with the lowest bankruptcy rates per 10,000 population were
those with the most protective garnishment statutes (i.e., those with 100% exemptions
or liberal minimum flat allowances). For example, North Carolina had a bankruptcy
rate of .8 per 10,000 population, Pennsylvania 1.3 and Texas 1.5; all three exempt 100%
of a debtor's earnings from garnishment. Maryland exempts a flat $120 per week and
its rate was .9 per 10,000. All of the states with the highest bankruptcy rates, including
Alabama (28.1), Nevada (23.4), Kansas (24.5), Tennessee (22.6), Oregon (20.8) and
Maine (19.8), allow only the minimum exemption mandated by Title I. Note, Wage
Garnishment, supra note 76, at 148, citing [1972] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN.
REP. at table F-2 and 1966 and 1972 STATISTICAL ABsTRAcTS.
A Michigan State University study found that 80% of persons who went bankrupt
had been threatened by wage garnishment and that 75% indicated that garnishment,
or the threat of it, was the reason they filed for bankruptcy. See Hearings on H.R.
11601, supra note 16, at 793-94.
Linn K. Twinem, chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on
Consumer Bankruptcy at the time of the hearings on H.R. 11601 said, "Garnishment
frequently triggers bankruptcy." Id. at 766.
The text of the report prepared by the House Committee on Banking and Currency
to accompany H.R. 11601 stated:
Testimony and evidence received by your committee [Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs] before which the hearings on H.R. 11601 were held
clearly established a causal connection between harsh garnishment laws
and high levels of personal bankruptcies. Statistics obtained from the
Bankruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts further corroborate this conclusion.
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1978.
104. Testimony taken during the hearings on H.R. 11601 further supported the
causal connection between garnishment and bankruptcy:
The underlying causes of personal or consumer bankruptcies are:
unemployment, over extension of credit, deficiency claims arising from
the repossession of [goods sold on installment contracts], excessive in-
terest rates and unusual medical and hospital bills; but the one overrid-
ing cause. . . is the garnishment or threat of garnishment of wages. ...
Hearings on H. R. 11601, supra note 16, at 419 (testimony of Estes Snedecor, referee in
bankruptcy).
In H.R. REP. No. 1040, the Committee on Banking and Currency reported:
"Eloquent testimony on the relationship between harsh garnishment laws and levels
of personal bankruptcies [tiwas [sic] received from four U.S. referees in bankruptcy.
... Each of these experienced referees in bankruptcy endorsed the need for restricting
the garnishment of wages." H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1978.
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mer Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz testified that there was
widespread opinion among judges, lawyers, ecomomists and
bankruptcy referees, supported by considerable evidence, that
a correlation existed between wage garnishments and the num-
ber of consumer bankruptcies.' 5 Statistical data also supports
the conclusion that Title III achieved one of its desired ef-
fects-to reduce the steadily increasing rate of personal bank-
ruptcies by uniformly raising the minimum level of exemption
to 75%.101 Of the states whose exemption levels were raised by
Title III to 75% in 1970, the median change in their bankruptcy
rates during fiscal year 1970-71 was a decrease of 0.6%. How-
ever, in those states with exemptions at or above 75% and
therefore unaffected by Title Ill, there was a median increase
during the same period of 8.7%.107 But, if large numbers of
personal bankruptcies, as opposed to a slight reduction in the
bankruptcy rate, are seen as too high a social price to pay for
wage garnishment, Title III has failed.
California's bankruptcy rate climbed steadily during the
ten year period from 1959 through 1969 reaching a peak of 19.8
bankrupcies per 10,000 population in 1968 and a near equal
19.2 rate in 1969.05 In 1970, when the minimum exemption
level was raised from 50% to 75%, the bankruptcy rate dropped
significantly for the first time to 16.7 per 10,000.' °1 Since 1970,
the rate has remained fairly constant between 15-16 per 10,000;
in fiscal year 1974, it was approximately 15.6. Translating these
bankruptcy rates into actual numbers, it means that by June
30, 1974, 38,412 bankruptcy actions were pending in Califor-
nia"0 with Los Angeles acquiring the unenviable claim to "the
bankruptcy capital of the country.""' Nationally, the number
105. Hearings on S. 750 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 866 (1964).
106. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 28-
32 (1971); Shuchman & Jantscher, Effects of the Federal Minimum Exemption from
Wage Garnishment on Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Rates, 77 CoM. L.J. 360 (1972); Note,
Wage Garnishment, supra note 76, at 147-51.
107. Shuchman & Jantscher, Effects of the Federal Minimum Exemption from
Wage Garnishment on Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Rates, 77 CoM. L.J. 360 (1972).
108. Note, Wage Garnishment, supra note 76, at 163 app. B.
109. Id.
110. In 1974, California had an estimated population of 20,907,000, THE CONFER-
ENCE BOARD, A GUIDE TO CONSUMER MARKETS 1975/76, at 28 (1975), and during the fiscal
year 1973-74, 32,555 new-bankruptcies were filed, [1974] ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
CTs. ANN. RE'. at 516, resulting in a bankruptcy rate per 10,000 population of approxi-
mately 15.6.
111. See 28 PRs. FIN. L.Q. REP. at 81 (1974). James E. Moriarty, Referee in
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of personal bankruptcies spiraled from 18,510 in 1948 to 254,484
in 1975.112 The 1975 total marked a 34.3% increase over the
previous year and has been a "source of concern to legislators
and judges alike. ' 3 In San Fransisco, for instance, the bank-
ruptcy court estimated its case load rose 30 to 50% between
1973 and 1974."1 The Honorable Berkeley Wright expressed his
concern by stating that, "there has been an increase in bank-
ruptcy filings which is unparalleled in this history of the coun-
try."'' 5
While the reasons for personal financial hardships which
lead to bankruptcy are many,"'6 it appears that wage garnish-
ment, despite Title III, is still a strong factor in the eventual
occurrence of those bankruptcies."7 Those states which have
Bankruptcy, United States District Court for the Central District of California, stated
during the hearings on H.R. 11601, "California and particularly the central district of
California, which encompasses the metropolitan area of Los Angeles, has been referred
to as the bankruptcy capital of the world. The figures support this dubious honor."
Hearings on H.R. 11601, supra note 16, at 431.
112. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS. AND THE FED. JUDICIAL CENTER, THE THIRD
BRANCH, No. 11, at 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as THE THIRD BRANCH].
113. THE THIRD BRANCH, supra note 112, No.1, at 2 (1976).
114. See 28 PERs. FIN. L.Q. REP. at 81 (1974).
115. 29 PERs. FIN. L.Q. REP. at 64 (1975). Judge Wright, Chief, Division of
Bankruptcy, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, testified before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee
on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32.
The increase in bankruptcies is costly to creditors since most nonbusiness bank-
ruptcies leave no assets to be distributed. "For the United States generally, only 13%
of personal bankrupts had assets available to creditors. In these cases, creditors re-
ceived about eight cents on the dollar." Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARV.
L. REy. 1452, 1453-54 (1964).
116. A study by the Brookings Institution found that 31% of those who were
asked why they were in financial difficulty cited poor debt management as the primary
cause. Twenty-eight percent cited family health problems as the cause while another
20% found the cause related to job problems. Debt collection harassment, legal pro-
ceedings, personal problems (drinking, gambling, marital problems) and major prop-
erty losses were also cited by a significant number of those interviewed. D. STANLEY &
M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PRocEss, REFORM 47 (1971).
117. The two examples following are illustrative of how garnishment can cause
bankruptcy. The first is from testimony by Estes Snedecor, referee in bankruptcy,
during hearings on H.R. 11601:
Just the other day I had a bankrupt in court whose back was broken
3 years ago in an industrial accident. For over two years he and his family
had existed on compensation from the industrial accident commission.
Then for 6 months or more, on job training [sic] he became skilled for
technical indoor work. Very soon after he obtained fulltime work and was
rehabilitated and was released from the accident commission[,] his sal-
ary was garnished and being unable to maintain his family and meet the
debts of his past misfortunes he resorted to bankruptcy in order to obtain
a new start in life.
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recognized this, and have effectively abolished wage garnish-
ment of low-income debtors,' have a bankruptcy rate which
is only one-fourth the national average. In light of the hope
expressed by the Committee on Banking and Currency that
"limitations on the garnishment of wages [would] relieve
countless honest debtors driven by economic desperation from
plunging into bankruptcy," it is not difficult to conclude, with
an eye on the bankruptcy statistics, that Title III has not lived
up to its expectations in this area."9 Thus, if a significant re-
duction in the number of people forced into bankruptcy is still
a bona fide congressional aim, abolition of wage garnishment,
at least with respect to the low-income debtor, appears to be
the only solution.
It is not unusual for a collection agency to garnish the wages of some
handicapped person trying to earn his living at the Goodwill Industries
in Portland.
Hearings on H.R. 11601, supra note 16, at 421. The second example is from an article
by James P. Gannon, staff reporter for the Wall Street Journal, which was submitted
for the record during the hearings on H.R. 11601:
The records of Inland Steel Co. indicate how widespread wage at-
tachment can be. Each payday the company makes such deductions from
the paychecks of about 2,000 of its 22,000 production employees in the
Chicago area, says Dorothy A. Lascoe, who handles the chore. Inland
annually pays out more than $500,000 of withheld wages to creditors, she
adds.
Who are the people behind the statistics? Most often, they are work-
ing men like Franchot Tone Reed, a 29-year-old tire mounter for a
Chicago-area truck manufacturer, who learned of garnishment the hard
way.
In 1964 Mr. Reed traded his 1956 Plymouth in on a 1950 Cadillac and
signed an installment sales contract to pay $1,200 for the aging car in 48
weekly payments of $25. After he defaulted, the dealer repossessed the
car and had Mr. Reed's wages attached to pay off the contract. The
deduction took 15% of his pay, the legal limit on garnishments in Illinois.
To "get cut loose" from his debts and the garnishment, Mr. Reed
filed bankruptcy late in 1964. Last year [1965], Federal bankruptcy
court in Chicago discharged Mr. Reed of $2,195 in debts, including bills
for jewelry and clothing as well as the costly old Cadillac.
Id. at 421.
118. See FLA. STAT. § 222.11 (1965) (100% exemption for heads of family); MD.
CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 15-602 (1975) (75% or amount equal to $120 multiplied by the
number of weeks in which such wages were earned-except for four counties which
abide by federal minimums); MAss. GE. LAws ANN. ch. 246, § 28 (West Supp. 1976)
($125 per week exemption); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (Purdon 1966) (100% exemp-
tion); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-20-12 (1967) (100% exemption where needed for
support of the family); TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 28 (100% exemption).
These states had an average bankruptcy rate of 2.3 per 10,000 population while
the national average in 1971-72 was 9.2. Note, Wage Garnishment, supra note 76, at
149.
119. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in [19681 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1963.
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Loss of Employment
Since it is self-defeating to cause a debtor to lose the only
means by which he can satisfy his debt, another of the aims of
Title III was to protect default-debtors from being discharged
from employment.2 0 In the cities which Caplovitz studied, 19%
of those garnisheed lost their jobs because of dismissal or fear
of dismissal.2 ' Before Title III went into effect, 48% of those
employed by an employer not tolerating even one garnishment
(now illegal) lost their jobs; 30% of those working for an em-
ployer not tolerating two garnishments lost their jobs; and 19%
of those working for an employer who tolerated three or more
separate garnishments lost their jobs. 2 Since Title I only
prohibits discharging an employee for one garnishment pro-
ceeding, but not for more than one, 49% of the workers studied
still would have lost their jobs had Title III been in effect. 2 '
The Los Angeles study revealed that 54% of the employers
believed that garnishment caused their employees to perform
at less than maximum efficiency."' Arguably then, it would be
easy for such an employer to dismiss the garnisheed worker and
mask the true reason for his or her discharge. Once dismissed,
the debtor is thrust into the ranks of the unemployed and is
faced with an unemployment rate higher than at any time
during the postwar era. 2 ' Unskilled workers employed in small,
minimum-wage companies, although only slightly more apt to
120. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1671(a)(2) (1968) (effective July 1, 1970).
121. CAP vrrz, supra note 15, at 238. The cities.were New York, Chicago and
Detroit.
122. Id. at 240.
123. See note 33 and accompanying text supra. The Los Angeles study supports
this finding. The average case of wage garnishment studied consisted of 2.4 garnish-
ments while the average employer dismissed the debtor after an average of 2.6 garnish-
ments-meaning roughly 40% of all garnished debtors ran the risk of losing their job
because of garnishment. Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 35.
It should be noted that union membership had a significant effect in decreasing
the percentage of those garnisheed who were discharged from employment. Only 13%
of those garnisheed who were union members, compared with 33% of the non-union
members, lost their jobs. CAPLOvrrZ, supra note 15, at 241. The poor (earning under
$4,000 annually) were also more likely to lose their jobs than those in higher income
brackets. Id.
124. Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 48.
125. St. Marie & Bednarzik, Employment and Unemployment During 1975, 99
MoNTHLY LAB. REv. 15 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Employment].
The unemployment rate is approximately 8.4% nationally (7.8% for whites and
13.9% for blacks) or about eight million persons. The unemployment rate was a record
9.7% in California in the first half of 1975. Burke, California-End of Growth, Bus.
REv. Summer, 1975, at 25.
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be garnisheed than their counterparts in medium and large
companies, are more than ten times as likely to lose their job
as the result of garnishment than skilled workers.'26 Thus, the
unskilled worker, the least likely to be able to find permanent
employment, is the most likely to lose the job he already has
and so desperately needs.
Added to this disasterous result, is the fact that a Title III
violation is extremely difficult to prove and effective enforce-
ment is nearly impossible.' 7 Because of these inadequacies,
loss of one's employment because of garnishment is still a real-
ity for many low-income debtors. As one commentator con-
cluded: "To create unemployment, even temporarily, because
of a collection device is clearly an undesirable social cost. Los-
ing one's job, with all its unhappy implications, causes human
distress that is difficult to measure. Other collection devices do
not create this problem."'2
Inability to Subsist
It has been stated that the underlying purpose of the 75%
protection of a debtor's income is to allow him to keep enough
of his wages to insure a minimum standard of living.' 9 Califor-
nia's law, in theory, protects all of a person's wages necessary
to support his family. 3 ' In reality, however, neither the federal
nor the California garnishment provisions have had their de-
sired effect.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has estimated that, in an
inflationary economy, the average wage-earner needs 85 to 90%
of his salary, after taxes, to keep up with his daily expenses.,
The typical garnishee, as shown by the Caplovitz study, is not
the "average wage-earner"-he is typically black, young, head
of a household, underpaid, undereducated and most likely a
blue-collar worker. He is much more likely to need almost all
of his daily wages just to subsist. 32
Inflation has not been kind to the wage-earner. Prior to
126. Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 5.
127. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
128. Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759, 761.
129. See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
130. See notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
131. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS REP. No. 237093, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES
AND INCOME I 93 (1965).
132. Ryan & Maynes, The Excessively Indebted: Who and Why?, 3 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 107, 112 (1969).
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1968, annual wholesale price increases exceeded 3% only once.
In 1971, wholesale prices increased 13.1%; in 1974, it reached
18.9%. 13 In addition, increases in the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) prior to 1966 remained well below 2%. In 1973, consumer
prices rose 6.2% and then skyrocketed another 11% in 1974.134
The CPI rose another 9.1% in 1975.111 On the other side of the
coin, in 1973, the average annual increase in real compensation
rose only 0.6% for the manufacturing sector and 0.3% for pri-
vate non-farm workers.'30 Continuing from 1973, the average
worker's real earnings suffered steady erosion.'37 The brunt of
this shrinkage of real wages weighed most heavily upon low-
income families as evidenced by the fact that food and shelter
absorbed an average of 71% of their earnings, compared to 50%
of the earnings of upper-income families.'38
With regard to unemployment rates, male heads of house-
holds tend to have lower rates than the national average-they
are more likely to possess the skills and education necessary to
be productive workers and are likely to have a strong commit-
ment to the work force.'39 The rate of unemployment for such
male heads of households was about 2% in late 1973, but that
rate jumped to 5.5% in 1975.110 Therefore, the same general
group that is most likely to be affected by wage garnish-
ment-low-income, black, heads of households-has been ren-
dered, by inflationary erosion of their wages, the least able to
afford any loss of earnings. The 75% exemption required by
Title III means little to a family head that needs 71% of his
weekly earnings for daily subsistence. One of the supposed ad-
vantages of a percentage exemption is that it will keep pace
133. Freedman, Inflation in the United States, 1959-74: Its Impact on Employ-
ment, Incomes and Industrial Relations, 112 INT'L LAB. Rzv. 125, 126 table 1 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Freedman].
134. Id.
135. 2 CHARTBOOK ON PICES, WAGES AND PRODUCTIVTY No. 7, at 6 (1976).
136. Freedman, supra note 133, at 136.
137. Freedman stated: "From late 1973 onward, the average worker's real earn-
ings suffered steady erosion, declining 1.8 per cent from October to November 1974
alone, when they were worth 5.6 per cent less than in November a year earlier." Id. at
135.
138. A congressional staff study has estimated that the impact of inflation has
fallen at least one-third harder on low-income persons than on those of middle or upper
incomes. Id.
139. 1975 Employment, supra note 125, at 16. The unemployment rate for fe-
male heads of households was 7% in 1973, but reached 10% by the second quarter of
1975. Id.
140. Id.
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with inflationary rises in prices-yet, this is exactly what it has
failed to do.
The flat exemption of thirty times the federal minimum
wage' also does not afford much protection to those who need
it most. Using 1967 as the base year, the real purchasing power
of the dollar as measured by consumer prices steadily eroded
until its relative worth in 1974 was a mere 68 cents.' Under
Title III, a person earning $69 per week or less, already well
below the poverty line,'43 is exempt from any garnishment. For
those earning above $69 per week but less than $92, the entire
difference can be garnisheed; weekly earnings above $92 are
subject to 25% seizure.' This produces the seemingly inequita-
ble result that a family head earning $400 per week (over
$20,000 per year) will have $300 per week exempted from gar-
nishment, while the man earning $75 per week, or $3,900 per
year (which is well below the poverty level), could still have $6
taken from his paycheck each week. The fact that the poor
man's earnings are 92% exempt appears unimportant upon the
realization that be cannot totally protect his $75 while his more
affluent counterpart can protect $300.'11
141. As of 1976, the federal minimum wage was increased to $2.30 per hour. 29
U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1) (West Supp. 1975).
142. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, A GUIDE TO CONSUMER MARKETS 1975/76, at 251
(1975).
143. Sixty-nine dollars per week yields an annual income of $3,588. The poverty
level, as set by the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, is $4,540 per year
for a nonfarm family of four. Id. at 140. The median family income for a white nonfarm
family of four was $12,595 in 1973 while for black nonfarm families it was $7,596.
However, 32.1% of black family heads earned less than $5,000 per year. Id. at 127-28.
144. See 29 C.F.R. § 870.10(b) (1971).
145. Some states have attempted to remedy this situation by setting a minimum
wage level below which no garnishment is allowed. For example, Massachusetts ex-
empts $125 per week but, above that minimum, 25% can be taken. MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 246, § 28 (West Supp. 1976-77). Maryland exempts 25% above a floor of $120
per week. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-602 (1975). New Jersey exempts 90% if
earnings are less than $7,500 per year and will reduce the exemption by court order if
earnings are more than $7,500. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:17-57 (1973). New York exempts
$85 per week and 90% above that. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5231(b) (McKinney Supp.
1976-77). New Hampshire exempts the greater of fifty times the federal minimum
hourly wage or $115 per week. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 512.21 (1972). Alaska exempts
a flat $350 over a thirty-day period for a family head and $200 for those who are single.
ALASKA STAT. § 90.35.080 (1967). Hawaii exempts 95% of the first $100 earned, 90% of
the next $100 and 80% of the excess of gross wages over $200 per month or the equiva-
lent per week. HAW. REv. STAT. § 612-1(a) (1969). Iowa exempts the federal minimum,
but will not allow garnishment above $250 per year per creditor except for child sup-
port. IOWA CODE § 627.12, 642.21 (1960 & Supp. 1976). Rhode Island exempts the
federal minimum of thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage or 75%, whichever
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California attempts to avoid this result by allowing a 100%
exemption if the debtor can prove all his earnings are necessary
to support his family. 48 However, if the debt is incurred for a
''common necessary of life,"' 47 total protection of earnings is
lost. Again, the result is inequitable; a spendthrift family head
earning $100 per week who defaulted on the payment of an
unusually expensive automobile' (not a common necessary)
would be exempt from any garnishment if he could show all of
his salary was needed to support his family. On the other hand,
a head of household earning the same income who defaulted on
a medical bill (a common necessary) could have $25 per week
taken out of his salary even though his family also needed all
of his income. The common necessaries exception to the 100%
exemption is misdirected; it directs attention to classifying
what the debt was for rather than ascertaining the needs of the
debtor. 9
The Los Angeles study revealed the shortcomings of the
procedure for claiming an exemption under the California gar-
nishment statute'50 in that less than 5% of those garnisheed
is greater, but also exempts 100% of a debtor's earnings for one year following the
discontinuance of welfare benefits. R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-26-4 (1956).
146. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.6(b) (West Supp. 1977) (effective Jan. 1, 1977);
see note 46 and accompanying text supra.
147. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.6(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977) (effective Jan. 1,
1977). Common necessaries are defined as those items which, in the hands of anyone,
are necessary to sustain life (such as food, heat and shelter). Los Angeles Fin. Co. v.
Flores, 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850, 856, 243 P.2d 139, 143-44 (1952). For a discussion
of the common necessaries exception, see notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
148. See Ratzlaff v. Portillo, 14 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 92 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1971)
(automobile held not a common necessary of life).
149. Largely because of these types of anomalies, the California Law Revision
Commission has recommended that the exception for common necessaries be elimi-
nated and that the procedure for filing for an exemption be simplified. LAW REVISION
COMM'N, Garnishment Recommendation, supra note 53, at 718-19. The Commission's
proposed comment on common necessaries states:
In actual operation, the effect of the "common necessaries" rule in
California was to decide the question whether competing creditors could
reach a debtor's earnings neither from the debtor's point of view (the
needs of the debtor's dependents were ignored) nor from the creditor's
viewpoint (no consideration was given to whether the creditor was careful
to advance credit to the debtor only after ascertaining that his credit
worthiness showed an ability to pay or whether the creditor provided the
debtor with quality goods or services). Rather, the claims of competing
creditors for earnings could be decided on the technical, and usually
irrelevant, issue of what was a "common necessary of life."
Id. at 774.
150. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.50 (West Supp. 1977); see note 52 surpa.
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ever filed for an exemption.'5 ' However, those who did file en-
joyed much success in the courts-their claims for exemptions
were either totally or partially granted in 86% of the cases
surveyed."'5 The average garnishee, entitled to an exemption if
he filed for it, is generally not in a position to know of his legal
rights and is ignorant of the entire exemption procedure. Not
surprisingly, only 20% of those debtors garnisheed retained an
attorney and many did not know of the garnishment until in-
formed of it by their employer.'53 As a result, few garnishees
have their day in court-87% of the cases proceed by default.'
When used, the procedure for filing an exemption can cause the
debtor hardship because it can force him to lose his pay for a
month while the right to his claim is being adjudicated.' With
neither California garnishment laws nor Title HI offering sub-
stantial protection to the low-income debtor, it is small wonder
that the Los Angeles study concluded that garnishment and
welfare are so closely related that they often become part of a
recurrent cycle of poverty. 5
151. Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 4. The average worker in the study
had a disposable income of less than $300 per month and supported an average of 3.6
dependents.
A study of Seattle District Justice Courts found that exemptions were requested
in only 6.5% of all garnishments. Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An
Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. Rav. 743, 797 at table 6, n.1.
152. See Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 4.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 5.
155. See CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.50(a) (West Supp. 1977). For a discussion
of the procedure for claiming an exemption, see note 52 supra.
156. The Los Angeles study stated:
[Glarnishment and welfare are intimately involved. A family may get
on welfare as a result of loss of employment of the breadwinner because
of wage garnishment. Then he may find employment again, get off wel-
fare, only to be garnished again. And so the cycle is repeated. In such
cases, the general public is subsidizing the collection of debts.
Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 105. A 1967 study conducted by the Santa Clara
County Welfare Department found that 18% of the 231 garnishment cases studied were
receiving welfare aid and another 11% had been on aid prior to the date of garnishment.
Id. at 103.
A survey in Milwaukee of 634 families which first became independent of welfare
during the months of October, 1964 and May, 1965, revealed that 23.3% of the families
suffered wage garnishment by February, 1966. Huber, Installment Credit Problems
Among Public Welfare Recipients, in Hearings on H.R. 11601, supra note 16, at 1027-
31.
Further, in a study of 827 persons applying for general assistance relief, the Cook
County Department of Public Aid in Chicago found that about 9% of the applicants
had been fired from their jobs due to garnishments. Hearings on H.R. 11601, supra note
16, at 766.
WAGE GARNISHMENT
CONCLUSION
Wage garnishment is a powerful and popular remedy and
is resorted to by creditors 95% of the time if given a choice
among remedies.'57 Yet, as examined by this comment, gar-
nishment punishes those groups of people least able to protect
themselves within the legal structure and least able to weather
further financial hardship-low-income, minority wage-
earners barely making enough to feed, clothe and house their
families. These people default on their debts most often be-
cause of circumstances beyond their control-loss of employ-
ment, illness or rising inflation. Neither Title III nor Califor-
nia's garnishment laws have sufficiently protected them. As a
result, they continue to suffer loss of employment, bankruptcy
and personal financial humiliation and frustration.' Such ef-
fects render wage garnishment as self-defeating as debtor'sprison."'9
In its application as a collection device, garnishment is a
crude form of medicine. It aims to cure society of an ill-
ness-people who default on their debts. Yet as a medicine, it
produces side effects more disastrous than the original malady
it seeks to cure. By restricting garnishment, Title III and the
California statutes may have cut down the dosage of medicine
and reduced slightly the number afflicted, but neither has
eliminated the harshness of its effects upon the low-income
debtor. Wage garnishment will continue to drive wage-earning
families "to the wall" until it is abolished.6 0
William Clifford Haggerty
Apparently recognizing the harsh consequences of letting recent welfare recipients
be garnisheed, Rhode Island exempts 100% of a debtor's earnings for one year after the
discontinuance of welfare benefits. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-26-4 (1956).
157. See Los ANGELES STUDY, supra note 64, at 4.
158. See CAPLOVrrZ, supra note 15, at 273-89. Harsh garnishment laws were cited
as one of the major causes of the riots of 1968. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMrTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS 139-41 (1968).
159. See notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra.
160. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969).
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